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The Right to Treatment: Judicial
Realism-Judicial Initiative
INTRODUCTION
The moral right of mental patients to adequate care and treatment
has long been recognized in our society. Legal recognition of the same
right is still in the nascent stage of development.' Subsequent com-
ments in this section2 suggest constitutional bases and analogies for
the right. For purposes of this comment it is assumed that an adequate
legal foundation has been established by case law and responsible
commentary for recognizing a legally enforceable right to care and
treatment.
Assuming a court has a constitutional basis to act in the area, the
question remains whether it should act. Is it the best suited agency
of government to handle the problem? To what extent, if at all,
should the court defer to legislative initiatives in the area? To what
extent should a court break new ground on its own? Why must new
ground be broken? How should a court view its role vis-A-vis the
mentally ill generally? What interests of the mentally ill should a
court be most concerned in protecting? These questions, among others,
are discussed if not resolved in this comment.
In addition to suggesting why and how new approaches must be
taken in the area of right to treatment, it is the purpose of this
comment to contrast and analyze inconsistencies in current judicial
approaches to the mentally ill. This will be accomplished by exam-
ining how at least one court has been selective in the interests of
the mentally ill that it deems worthy of protection. Privacy has been
recognized by at least one court as deserving of aggressive state pro-
tection acting in the role of parens patriae. At the same time the
right to adequate care and treatment has not. Under analysis, it is
believed that such a distinction cannot, and in a humane society,
should not stand.
The first part of this comment attempts to identify the nature of
1. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353
Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).




the right to care and treatment problem as judicial rather than leg-
islative. It deals with how courts should view the problem, and why
they should take on an expanded or aggressive role in trying to solve
it.
The second part of the comment attempts to analyze a recent de-
cision protecting the interests in privacy of state mental patients. It
quarrels with (or at least seriously questions) the result reached in
the particular case but endorses the approach of the court as exem-
plary of the aggressive civil libertarian role necessary in dealing with
problems of the mentally ill. It is believed that such an approach
provides an excellent starting point for a court desirous of adopting
a constitutional right to care and treatment and in need of precedent
and common sense to buttress the right. The aim of this comment
then is to provide a rationale for the right in terms of a court's tra-
ditional role and within the boundaries of existing case law.
JUDICIAL REALISM: A NECESSARY FIRST STEP
[M]y reaction . . . would border on despair each time I went
[to the state hospital in question]. When I would leave I would
quickly put the place out of my mind .... [T]he film in . . . [a]
painful way revived the old feelings of depression and . . . anger
at myself for continuing to ignore the problem .... [I]n a small
way my reactions are a clue to why [such] institutions . . . exist.
There are some things we prefer not to know about . . . not too
unlike the Germans who live near Dachau.3
The psychological truth contained in this quotation serves as both
a starting point and a roadblock to subsequent analysis, evaluations,
and proposals contained in this comment. It is a major premise of this
article that problems of the mentally ill (particularly care and treat-
ment) have and for the foreseeable future will remain "low visibility"
problems4 in terms of public awareness. Precisely for this reason it
is believed courts must directly and aggressively concern themselves
3. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 349 N.E.2d 610, 614 & n.6 (1969) quoting
the remarks of a former director of legal medicine of the Massachusetts State Department
of Mental Health.
4. "Low visibility" for purposes of this analysis means outside the public eye, aware-
ness, or consciousness. A "low visibility" problem is one which the bulk of society does
not realize exists. This lack of awareness has important consequences for a court in its
scope of review. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 410, 507-08 (D. D.C. 1967). For a
discussion of the importance of the Hobson case in the mental health area, see note 15
infra.
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(and regard themselves as the proper forum) with problems of ade-
quate care and treatment of the mentally ill.
The role of the courts and the way they characterize and view
mental health problems is a necessary first step to any improvements
in the field. If courts are to undertake an expanded and more ag-
gressive role, as is believed imperative, certain realities must be ap-
preciated. The first is: mental health problems cannot realistically be
regarded as a matter of political or of primary legislative concern,
at least as an original matter.
THE LEGISLATURE: AN UNPROMISING FORUM
One view of what matters are of appropriate legislative concern
relates to power, both in terms of raw voting strength and lobbying
pressure groups.5 It is self-evident that mental patients as a class pos-
sess neither political power or influence. In many states, commitment
to a mental hospital means a suspension of the voting franchise. As
a practical matter, commitment results in an effective gutting of the
franchise, even where technically available. If it is conceded that as a
practical matter, legislative action is most often based on response to
political and lobbying power" rather than altruistic aims, one must
acknowledge that any great faith in the legislature as the sole forum
in solving mental health problems is unjustified.7
5. See, e.g., NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932).
6. While community mental health associations serve from time to time as legislative
lobbying groups, exerting political influence on behalf of the public institutionalized
patient does not appear to be one of their primary functions. Also in terms of financing
and numbers in the political sphere, mental health associations appear to wield little
power.7. The experience of the proposed right to treatment legislation in Pennsylvania
illustrates this fact. Despite dedicated effort on the part of many people, the legislation
first proposed in 1968 (S.B. 1274 & H.B. 2118, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess.) remains
unenacted. See The Right to Treatment-Encounter and Synthesis, 10 DUQ. L. REv. 554, 578
(1972). Senator Sam Ervin summed up the general problem of obtaining legislative at-
tention and results in the area of mental health. Speaking of his experience in trying
to obtain additional funds for mental hospitals in the North Carolina State Legislature,
Ervin observed:
I found when I got to the Legislature that it was difficult to make the average
legislator understand these basic needs because he had no observation or experience
with the problem.
I attribute it in part to the fact that hospitals for the mentally ill, unlike so many
educational institutions, have no powerful alumni who are active in politics, and
no one to present their cause. The general public really does not have an apprecia-
tion of what a serious problem it is, not only to society but to the individuals who
happen to be so unfortunate as to be confined under conditions where they get
nothing except custodial care.
Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Conj
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In many respects the position of public mental health patients can
be analogized to the plight of the blacks in the South in the early
part of this century. Both were denied, either formally or practically,
the right to vote. Both were denied substantial constitutional and
legal protections that are now deemed fundamental. Perhaps as a re-
sult neither group possessed adequate funding, training, and access
to communications media to make their predicament widely known.
Arguably one reason that the legal and constitutional status of blacks
has changed over the past two decades has been the public awareness
of racial discrimination problems generated by the communications
media. There can be no doubt that changes in public opinion and
legislative attitude were at least hastened by the media's influence. A
prerequisite to legislative response then would generally seem to be
some degree of public awareness.8
Similarly it is believed that mental patients must be placed in a
"high visibility" position before their problems can ever be adequately
defined and addressed by legislative means. So long as mental patients
maintain their present "low profile" it is easy for society and legisla-
tures to ignore them. As mentioned previously, mental patients as a
voting bloc need not be feared at the polls. Nor, because of the nature
of their disability, need society fear that mental patients will engage
in demonstrations or acts of civil disobedience on any group basis.
It is unlikely, for example, that an articulate leader or spokesman
will emerge from the ranks of the mentally ill to publicize various
problems and appeal to the public conscience.9 Under present condi-
tions then, institutional patients are incapable of helping themselves
publicize their dilemma.
Since mental patients cannot help themselves, the question arises:
gress in Washington, D.C., on November 11, 1969, at 60. It has also been observed by
Dr. Morton Birnbaum that:
There are many regressed patients, many elderly patients and many retarded
patients who are just sitting around the hospitals doing nothing. They are not com-
plaining loudly, they are not writing letters to newspapers, to their legislators or to
their governor and, they are not suing anyone.
Id. at 64.
8. A premise on which this argument is based is that a certain residuum of public
empathy exists among the body politic. It is assumed that if the public at large is made
aware of substandard institutional conditions, they will register some sort of protest to
have those conditions remedied or corrected. For a fuller discussion of this premise and
corollaries, see p. 624, infra. The premise is not unrealistic as evidenced by the recent
furor caused by publication of conditions in a mentally retarded institution in New
York. See TIME, February 14, 1972 at 67-69.
9. In the civil rights movement, of course, Martin Luther King filled this role during
the 1950's and 1960's. For a report on a nascent trend to organize which may undercut
the "leadership void" theory, see PARADE MAGAZINE, Jan. 15, 1972 at 16.
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what agency or branch of government should act in the capacity of
parens patriae to protect their interests? The legislature, if viewed as
a political body primarily responsive to popular electoral passions,
cannot generally be relied upon to act effectively in such a capacity.
The issue thus reduces to which other branch of government, or what
branches in conjunction, will best protect the interests of the institu-
tionalized mental patient.
THE EXECUTIVE: PRACTICAL ROADBLOCKS
What may the mentally ill in various states expect in the way of
protection from the executive branch of government, particularly
from the office of Attorney General? In recent times Attorney Gen-
erals' offices in various states have taken on greater amounts of "pub-
lic interest" litigation-especially in the fields of consumer and envi-
ronmental protection.' 0 Such is, for example, currently true of much
of the operation of the Attorney General's Office in Pennsylvania."'
While these efforts are to be applauded, it should be noted that for
the most part Attorney Generals seem to represent currently popular
political positions or causes. This is not surprising since most Attorney
Generals are either elected officials or appointed by, and directly re-
sponsible to, the governor-the highest elected official in the state.
As noted previously, the mentally ill represent neither a politically
visible or popular cause. No votes are to be gained by representing
their interests. These considerations apply mutatis mutandis to a well
intentioned Attorney General (who wishes to take the initiative and
act on his own in the mental health area), but whose priorities and
use of limited resources are determined to a great degree by political
realities.
Another problem in relying on the Attorney General as a protection
for the rights of the mentally ill is the potential conflict of interest.
In Pennsylvania, for example, the Attorney General must represent
the state (or committing administrative agency) against charges that
a patient's rights have been violated. The case of Dixon v. Attorney
General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,2 illustrates how the
office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General may often be on the other
side of the adversarial table from the patient.
10. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
11. Id.
12. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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It is believed, therefore, that a new administrative agency should
be created to undertake the protection of the involuntarily committed
mentally ill. It is unrealistic to expect private guardians or counsel
to do an effective job of representation of the mentally ill. It is rec-
ognized that creating a Public Defender's office to deal with and pro-
tect the rights of the mentally ill is no panacea. There may well be
problems of effective representation which will arise. Nevertheless,
such a step represents a qualitative improvement, especially when
weighed against the alternatives of other institutions or people (other
than the courts) representing the mentally ill on a continuing basis.
THE JUDICIARY: NATURAL PROTECTOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
What should be a court's role in handling a right to treatment issue
raised as a constitutional issue of first impression when a legislature
has not acted? The answer to this question in large measure depends
on one's judicial philosophy, and whether one views the right to treat-
ment issue as one capable of judicial solution. It has already been
suggested that neither the legislature nor the executive will, as a practi-
cal matter, address themselves to the right to treatment issue on their
own. Should the court fill the vacuum, and if so, how and why? Also,
assuming it should act in some capacity, how far should it go in imple-
menting standards and details of the right?
It is believed the court must fill the vacuum created by the legis-
lature's abstinence and indifference. Put simply, there is no other
forum to turn to for resolution of the problem. There are reasons,
nevertheless, why a court is ideally suited to treat the problem ini-
tially. Assuming for the moment that the care and treatment of the
mentally ill is a "low visibility" problem because either society rejects,
ignores, or is uncomfortable with them, the conclusion is inescapable
that the mentally ill do not represent a popular cause. It is precisely
for this reason that the problems of the mentally ill should be in
court: they are not generally popular. In speaking of the role of a
court in our society, it has been said, "The measure of any society is
not how it treats those persons whom it admires, but how it treats
those whom it despises.' 3
Professor Bickel, commenting on the need for courts (in this case
the Supreme Court) to lead and educate said:
13. Address by Dean Ronald Davenport, Duquesne University, November 9, 1971.
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If what is meant is that the Court is restricted to deciding an
existing national consensus; that it is to enforce as law only the
most widely shared values ... this would charge the Court with
a function to which it is, of all our institutions, least suited. Surely
the political institutions are more fitted than the Court to find
and express an existing consensus . . . The Court is a leader of
opinion not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not
merely impose its own; and-the short of it is-it labors under
the obligation to succeed. 14
The Court must act both as a leader and as a conscience in the
mental health area. It must serve as the prime protector of individual
rights and civil liberties.' 5 It must be the main forum on which an ag-
14. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 239 (1962).
15. A recent decision of relevance for discussion here held that the Superintendent,
and The Board of Education of The District of Columbia, in operation of their public
school system unconstitutionally deprived Negro and poor public school children of their
right to equal educational opportunity with white and more affluent public school
children. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 410 (D. D.C. 1967).
In Hobson Judge Skelly Wright (in the course of a lengthy opinion) addressed himself
to the issue of what the proper scope of review is for a court dealing with a de facto
segregation problem. He noted that when a critical personal right is involved any classifi-
cation, must be remitted to a penetrating scope of judicial review in search of adequate
justification. The need for investigating justification is strengthened, according to Judge
Wright, when the practice though not explicitly singling out for special treatment any
of the groups for which the Constitution has a special solicitude, operates in such a
way that one such group is harshly and disproportionately disadvantaged.
Judge Wright explained the policy reasons behind the need for a stricter standard of
judicial review:
The explanation for this additional scrutiny of practices relates to the judicial
attitude toward legislative and administrative judgments. Judicial deference to these
judgments is predicated in the confidence courts have that they are just resolutions
of conflicting interests. This confidence is often misplaced when the vital interests of
the poor and or racial minorities are involved. For these groups are not always
assured of a full and fair hearing through the ordinary political processes, not so
much because of the chance of outright bias, but because of the abiding danger the
power structure . . . may incline to pay little heed to even the deserving interests of
a politically voiceless and invisible minority. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 508. Such considerations, the court concluded, compel a closer judicial surveillance
and review of administrative judgments adversely affecting racial minorities, and the
poor, than would otherwise be necessary. Id. at 507-08, See Note, 81 HNARV. L. Rxv. 1511
(1967) for a full exposition and criticism of the "stricter" standard. While the stricter
standard is put forward in an equal protection decision (i.e., Hobson), it is believed that
it should apply with equal force where a substantial due process claim is raised by a
group, such as the mentally ill or other disadvantaged minorities, lacking effective access
to the legislature. Cf. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return
of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716, 740 (1968-69). Karst
in discussing discrimination against a disadvantaged group, observes that the easy cases
involve discrimination against a racial minority written into law. He goes on to note,
however, that discrimination need not necessarily be made an explicit part of state policy
but may result from a formally non-discriminatory classification. Id. Since most legisla-
tion has differential effects on various groups, discrimination (resulting from a non-
discriminatory classification) can be found in almost anything government does or fails
to do. Karst raises the question what groups can be called "disadvantaged" and notes
that in addition to race and indigency, other likely candidates for inclusion are women
and students. Id. at 740-41. It is hard to see in comparison to such groups, how the
mentally ill should not be considered "disadvantaged." Cf. Coons, Clune, Sugarman,
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grieved mental patient can rely if his rights have been abused during
commitment or confinement.
A Supreme Court which rendered a Brow.n v. Board of Education6
and an In re Gault7 decision (causing revolutionary rethinking in
civil rights and juvenile law) has ample precedent for issuing a seminal
case law ruling in the mental health field.'8 The forces set in motion
by the Brown decision illustrate the potential impact of a Supreme
Court decision. It also illustrates how, if it does not abuse the power,
the Supreme Court may lead and shape public opinion on certain
matters. It is at least time that the Court grant certiorari and deal
with the important due process issue of first impression that have been
continually presented to it during the past decade. Although the above
comments are directed at the United States Supreme Court, they are
equally applicable to progressive state appellate courts. Little current
authority prevents them from rethinking the problems of the mentally
ill.19
POSSIBLE OBJECrIONS
It is necessary to anticipate certain arguments that may be put for-
ward against courts involving themselves as leaders and primary pro-
tectors of the rights of the mentally ill. For the most part these argu-
ments are jurisprudential-relating to a different philosophy of the
judicial process than is suggested by this comment.
One argument of the critics is likely to be something like the follow-
Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures,
57 CAL. L. Riv. 305, 389 (1969), wherein the problem of disadvantaged children and their
ethical claim to preferred treatment is discussed.
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. This is not to say that either Brown or Gault did not develop against a backdrop
of related cases that had evolved at lower and higher appellate levels. With respect to
Brown, see e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Wilson v. Bd. of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950),
motion to affirm granted, 340 U.S. 909 (1951). The argument put forward is that there
has been sufficient litigation of the right to treatment issue by lower federal courts and
state appellate courts to at least warrant Supreme Court review of the substantial con-
stitutional issues presented. Cf. The Right To Treatment-Encounter and Synthesis,
supra note 7, at 554; Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right to Treatment," 23 ALA. L.
REv. 623, 635 & n.26.
19. Unlike the Brown situation a court need not worry about upsetting any estab-
lished legal doctrine, as for example, was involved in overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896). Any reliance or disturbed expectations on the part of state officials from
a change arises solely from prior apathy, not legal doctrine. An argument of administrative
inconvenience loses its force in light of Supreme Court decisions in the right to counsel
and school busing areas. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1 (1971); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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ing: the proper rule of courts generally is the reasoned application of
established principles to specific cases. 20 In the process of carrying out
that function, courts necessarily have to develop the implications of
general principles and adapt them to varying and new circumstances.
Generally the principles are well articulated within a body of law. Some-
times courts seek to establish that a right was implicit in preexisting
law. The step involved in such a situation, according to commentators,
is much larger than the usual case of common law adaptation. 21
Such a philosophy argues that the acceptance of such a large step
(in this instance a court's recognition of a constitutional right to treat-
ment) depends upon the idea that the actions against which the new
judicial sanctions are sought represent conduct which violates com-
munity standards of propriety. In other words, the argument goes, be-
fore a new principle is recognized, it should represent established
community standards before it can properly be adopted. The simple
answer to this argument is that current care and treatment of the
mentally ill constitutes a national scandal and would, if widely known,
violate any community standard of propriety.
Even assuming arguendo, that community standards are not violated
by current treatment methods, the argument can be limited and dis-
tinguished. And even in limited situations it would appear the principle
is not dispositive (it is subject to and often outweighed by counter-
vailing consideration). For instance, the principle by its own terms
is limited to situations where the adoption of the new principle is
substantially in dispute within the community. Query, whether the
adoption of a right to treatment is the subject of any controversy within
the community? And even if it is, it should be noted that courts often
have decided such questions-as, for example, in the desegregation and
criminal procedure areas. 22
Another questionable assumption underlying the theory that major
changes in the law should not be made by judges, is that it operates
most strongly where a legal doctrine has become well-established.23 In
the right to treatment situation it is difficult to find any entrenched
legal doctrine as one would, for example, in the area of charitable
immunity. If there has been any reliance, it is the result of apathy and
20. MISHKIN AND MoRus, ON LAW IN COURTS 121 (1965).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. MISHKIN AND Molms, supra note 20, at 257-58.
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lack of concern. No legal doctrine, however archaic, need be threatened
or destroyed by the recognition of a right to treatment.
Finally, what the "go slow with major changes in the law theory"
overlooks is the role of law as a dispenser of justice. One need only con-
sider the effect of denying relief to one who has been injured by actions
generally acknowledged to be improper, to appreciate the importance
of this function of law. Denial of redress for someone who asserts what
is seen as a just claim tends to weaken this view of law by defeating
the expectations it arouses.24
What is also ignored by the "go slow" theory is that legislatures
cannot be relied on to act on every problem which comes up, even after
the need has arisen. It would seem essential then, that courts be au-
thorized to grant relief in the "unprovided-for ' 25 (unforeseen) case of
violation of community standards. Such a role has been described as
one of responding to the complaint of a "one man lobby" after he
has been injured.2 6 Under such a view the fact the legislature might
also be able to act on the same kind of issue is irrelevant. The assump-
tion is that in certain areas the jurisdiction of legislatures and courts
overlap, and there is nothing improper in one forum acting before the
other. This is especially true in the unprovided-for case.
COMMONWEALTH v. WIsEMAN: RIGHT APPROACH, WRONG RESULT
If courts are to take on a larger role in adopting the recognition of
a right to treatment they will need some guidance in terms of approach.
A recent case, Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 27 in the privacy area ex-
hibits a commendable affirmative approach in regards to looking after
the interests of the mentally ill in a parens patriae capacity. While
Wiseman can be faulted in some respects, it is necessary first to under-
stand the contribution it makes as precedent to the mental health area.
In Wiseman, the court held that the showing of a film to a general
audience on a commercial basis about a state mental hospital in which
identifiable inmates were naked or exhibited painful aspects of mental
disease could be enjoined as an invasion of the inmates' right to pri-
24. Id. at 122.
25. Id. The unforeseen case arises 1) because it is impossible to ordain comprehensive
rules in advance, and 2) because legislatures as a practical matter cannot be relied upon
to act on every problem which comes up--even after an awareness of a particular need
has arisen.
26. Id.
27. 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969).
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vacy.28 Although the case was decided on alternative grounds,29 the
important point for our purposes is that the court held the Common-
wealth had standing and a duty to protect reasonably, and in a manner
consistent with other public interests, the inmates from any invasions
of their privacy.
By virtue of the general power of the legislature in its capacity as
parens patriae to make suitable provisions for (care and custody of)
mental patients, the court reasoned, certain duties devolve upon the
state. One is the duty to exercise proper controls over the persons con-
fined and the conditions of their custody. Another is to afford the in-
mates protection and kindness"° consistent with the terms and rehabili-
tative purposes of their commitments.
The Wiseman court, based on this affirmative duty of protection and
kindness, held that hospital officials under reasonable standards of
custodial conduct, could not permit merely curious members of the
public access to the hospital to directly view many of the activities in
the film. The court thought it equally inconsistent with the same of-
ficial's custodial duties to permit the general public (as opposed mem-
bers of groups with a legitimate, significant interest) to view films
showing inmates naked or exhibiting painful aspects of mental disease.
While the Wiseman court may be applauded for its aggressive ap-
proach, the interest it deemed worthy of protection can be viewed suspi-
ciously. The privacy of mental patients in institutions may be important
-that is, the public disclosure of private facts may offend us. At the same
time it should be noted that protecting this interest also serves to pro-
tect the interest of public officials connected with mental hospitals who
may be doing an incompetent job. As a practical matter this considera-
tion has weighed heavily with courts in other contexts. 31
The problem then in holding that the patient's right to privacy out-
weighs the public's right to know is that the public will probably never
know of certain conditions that exist in mental hospitals.3 2 To the
extent that such conditions are the result of official inaction or in-
28. Id. at 252, 249 N.E.2d at 610.
29. The alternative basis for the decision rested on the failure of the producers of
the film to obtain properly executed releases before depicting patients on the screen. Id.
at 259, 249 N.E.2d at 617.
30. Id. at 258, 249 N.E.2d at 616.
31. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
32. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that too few people already know too
little about the plight of the mentally ill-especially with regard to inadequate care
and treatment. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text. The Wiseman holding rep-
resents the worst possible answer to the general problem of "low visibility."
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competence, the situation will never be remedied because it can never
be brought to the public's attention.
In striking the balance in favor of privacy the court observed that
the record did not indicate that any inmate shown in the film, by
reason of past conduct, had any special news interests as an individual.33
The court found the case to be distinguishable from decisions which
have permitted publication of newsworthy events where the public
interest in the reasonable dissemination of news has been treated as
more significant than private interests in privacy.34 The court did not
articulate why and how the privacy of mental patients was distinguish-
able and subsequent cases in related areas may have seriously under-
mined any balance that might be struck in favor of privacy.
For instance, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.3 5 held that a libel
action by a private individual against a radio station for a defamatory
falsehood in a newscast relating to his involvement in an event of
public or general concern may be sustained only upon clear and con-
vincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of the truth. The
importance of the decision for our purposes is that it extends the New
York Times rule36 to private persons who become involved in an event
of public or general concern. While the Court did not provide criteria
to determine how and when something becomes a matter of public or
general concern the following language suggests that the category is a
broad one:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "volun-
tarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest
is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the partici-
pant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not
the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. . . . Whether the
33. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 259, 249 N.E.2d 610, 617 (1969).
34. Id. The principal privacy decision cited and distinguished by the court was
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Time, Inc. involved the publicity of the experi-
ence certain victims of a crime endured many years before. The publicity was thought
to be newsworthy because a play based on that event was concurrently showing on
Broadway. Although the Wiseman court enjoined general distribution of the film partly
because it feared a lurid or morbid interest in the plight of mental patients, it is hard
to see how Time, Inc. is distinguishable. It also focused on a rather morbid public
interest and involved presenting individuals in a false light in the public eye. Yet these
factors did not dissuade the Court from a finding of newsworthiness and consequently
allowing publication.
35. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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person involved is a famous large scale magazine distributor or a
"private" businessman running a corner newstand has no rele-
vance in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the
issue.37
Although the court left itself an out38 and was purposefully vague on
what made Rosenbloom a newsworthy person of general or public con-
cern,89 the decision is important insofar as it narrows the concept of
what may properly be regarded as "private." And despite talk of the
constitutional right to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut40 may be read
narrowly as relating to marital privacy and confined to its facts.
What makes Rosenbloom fairly persuasive authority in the privacy
area is the Court's suggestion that libel law protects two separate
interests of the individual: first, his desire to preserve a certain privacy
around his personality from unwarranted intrusion and, second a de-
sire to preserve his public good name and reputation.41 The majority
of the Court went on to say that the first interest-unwarranted in-
trusion-was not involved in Rosenbloom since, by hypothesis the
individual was involved in matters of public or general concern.
The Rosenbloom Court appears to have been purposefully ambigu-
ous in telling us how to determine what a newsworthy event is gener-
ally, or how they determine it in this particular case. The important
point for our purposes is that if Rosenbloom is taken at face value and
not strictly confined to its facts, it has an impact on the privacy interest
asserted and found paramount in Wiseman. Who is to say, after Rosen-
bloom, that depiction of the care and treatment that mental patients
receive in state hospitals is not a matter of public or general interest?
Who is to say that because of the patient's disease and the right of the
public to know of conditions in state institutions, mental patients have
not been involuntarily "thrust into the limelight" as was Rosenbloom?
Assuming that Rosenbloom as a defamation case is not dispositive
37. 403 U.S. at 43.
38. Id. at 44 & n.12. The Court said:
We are not to be understood as implying that no area of a person's activities falls
outside the area of public or general interest. We expressly leave open the question
of what constitutional standard . . . controls the enforcement of state libel laws for
defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news media about a person's activi-
ties not within the area of public or general interest.
39. While noting that the public's primary interest was in the "event" (Id. at 43), the
Court never identified what constituted the "event" in Rosenbloom. Although it is prob-
able that Rosenbloom's arrest was the "event" that made him a public figure, it is not
clearly articulated.
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This reading of Griswold was put forward in a lecture by
Professor Sheldon Nahmod, Duquesne University School of Law, February 8, 1972.
41. 403 U.S. at 48.
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on the privacy issue, one must examine the privacy line of precedent
that may bear on the question. For purposes of this analysis it will be
assumed that the scope of free speech should be narrower than it is in
the defamation area.42 Whether the scope of free speech should vary
according to the nature of the privacy interest that is invaded remains
an open question which is discussed, if not resolved, below. 43
For discussion purposes, Prosser's analytical breakdown of privacy
is not one tort but a complex of four. They are:
(1) Appropriation for defendant's benefit, or advantage of plain-
tiff's name or likeness. 44
(2) Intrusion upon plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion as by
invading his home or other quarters or an illegal search of his
shopping bag in a store.45
(3) Public disclosure of private facts consisting of the publicity of
a highly objectionable kind, given to private information
about the plaintiff (it is true so no action would be for de-
famation) .46
(4) Presenting in a false light in the public eye, this private tort
closely resembles defamation.4 7
While the Wiseman court did not identify or discuss which aspects
of the right of privacy were violated, the tort arguably involved ele-
ments of appropriation (although not for advertising purposes), in-
trusion, and public disclosure of private facts. Case precedents from
the intrusion and public disclosure of private facts area would seem
to be in point. For example, it has been held that when a plaintiff is
confined to a hospital bed 8 or in the seclusion of his home,49 the mak-
ing of a photograph constitutes an invasion of privacy (intrusion) for
which he is entitled to complain. Decisions in the public disclosure of
42. At least two reasons may underly such a notion: 1) people generally have a better
sense of what compromises a person's privacy than what constitutes falsehood or defa-
mation; and 2) a rebuttal remedy is for the most part counterproductive and ineffective
in a privacy context-especially where the public disclosure of private facts is involved
(assuming the facts are true). Lecture by Professor Sheldon Nahmod, Duquesne Univer-
sity School of Law, February 8, 1972.
43. It is arguable, for example, that no legitimate first amendment value is to be
served by the public disclosure of private facts. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLIT1AL
FR.EOM: THE CONSTITUIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960) wherein the distinction is
made between public and private speech. The former category is thought to warrant
much more first amendment protection.
44. W. PRossaR, ToRTs § 117 at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
45. Id. at 807.
46. Id. at 809.
47. Id. at 812.
48. 'Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Cf. Clayman v.
Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Philadelphia County 1940) (picture of semi-conscious
patient taken by physician).
49. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
622
Vol. 10: 609, 1972
Observations on the Right to Treatment
private facts area prohibiting public distribution have included medical
pictures of more intimate anatomy5" and embarassing details of a
woman's masculine characteristics and eccentric behavior.51
The crucial question to which the Wiseman court failed to address
itself was: what first amendment values would be served by the general
dissemination of the film showing conditions in Bridgewater State
Mental Hospital? If Meiklejohn's theors2 of the purposes behind the
first amendment is accepted, the court's reasoning in Wiseman becomes
less than convincing. According to Meiklejohn, the central purpose be-
hind the first amendment is self-government."8 Free expression is a
means by which people can become better informed on public issues
so they can better (more intelligently) govern themselves. Clearly this
purpose is not served by a decision which restricts dissemination of
information about conditions in state mental hospitals to certain inter-
ested professional groups.
In light of first amendment purposes, then, one must quarrel with
the finding contained in Wiseman that no inmate shown in the film, by
reason of past conduct, had any special news interest as an individual.54
One cannot be so certain, as the Wiseman court was, that decisions
treating the public interest in the reasonable dissemination of news as
more significant than the private interests in privacy and thus allowing
publication of newsworthy events are so easily distinguishable. 55
The argument for general distribution of the film is reinforced if
one reflects upon the observation that the mentally ill constitute a "low
visibility" problem. Under the Wiseman decision the mentally ill will
always retain a "low visibility" profile. According to Wiseman the
general public need not know of conditions in public mental hospitals,
and state officials in charge of these institutions need never account to
the public for the care and treatment (or lack of it) they provide. So
long as Wiseman remains good law the public will never, and can
never, appreciate the need for mental health reform in terms of im-
50. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30, F. Supp. 352 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) (X-rays of a
,woman's pelvic region); Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1920) (public
exhibition of films of caesarian operation); Griffin v. Medical Society, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109
(Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, N.Y. County 1939) (deformed nose).
51. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945), second appeal, 159 Fla. 31, 30
So. 2d 635 (1947).
52. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTrrTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1960).
53. Id. at 75.




proving conditions and providing better care and treatment. Certainly
any hope of a legislative response to the problem is precluded by the
Wiseman decision.
The paradox contained in Wiseman is this: the court concerned
itself with protecting the privacy and anonymity of mental patients.
The problem is that mental patients as a whole are already too anony-
mous-i.e., they are either a forgotten, rejected, or unknown class.
Admittedly the argument proposed in this comment against the
Wiseman result contains some underlying optimistic premises. They
are:
(1) The public as a whole can be educated to understand, appre-
ciate, and sympathize with the problems of the mentally ill
insofar as they relate to proper care and treatment.
(2) Contrary to the court's fears, 6 it is not thought the viewing
public will exhibit either a morbid interest or immature re-
action to a depiction of conditions in a mental institution un-
less the mode of presentation is extreme.
(3) If anything it is believed the public's humanitarian instincts
will be triggered and at least certain members of the com-
munity who come into contact with this information (how-
ever harsh and unpleasant) will try to improve conditions as
a result.
This is not to say, of course, that some people will not exhibit any or
all of the above negative reactions. Some, instead of responding to the
problem, will try to forget it by putting it at the back of their minds
-but that is where it is anyway and it is hard to see how the publi-
cation of conditions would exacerbate the current sad state of affairs.
In conclusion, the likelihood of the humiliation suffered by identifi-
able inmates in the film, it is submitted, is outweighed by the benefit
of showing the same film to general audiences. And the humiliation
suffered by mental patients should be kept in perspective. Endemic
to our society is a widespread "rejection mechanism" 57 of the mentally
ill and their problems. Legislatures, courts, and people in general have
all done their share of humiliating and/or rejecting the mentally ill. 5s
As a theoretical matter it may be asked which is more important to
the institutionalized patient: the right to adequate care and treatment
or the right to be free from humiliation of which he is not even aware?
56. Id. at 260, 249 N.E.2d at 618.
57. Discussions with Dr. Morton Birnbaum, Duquesne Law Review offices, November
18, 1971.
58. See, e.g., The Right To Treatment-Encounter and Synthesis, supra note 7, at 558.
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The answer would seem to be self-evident. And one might ask further:
how can damage to reputation be suffered by a group that is already
held in generally low esteem by many members of society?
CONCLUSION
If conditions in mental hospitals are to be materially improved, and
patients guaranteed adequate care and treatment, courts must be bold,
aggressive, and inquisitive. Reflection and action must go hand in hand.
Courts must first recognize that the right to treatment issue is one that
they and not the legislature is most competent and best equipped to
deal with initially. Second, they must be aware of existing approaches
that have been taken by courts genuinely interested in protecting the
interests of the mentally ill. They must have not only a sense of their
primary duties as parens patriae to the mentally ill, but also a sense of
priorities in terms of what is most important for the mentally ill. The
court may only act insofar as issues are brought before it-but it is
important for a court to appreciate priorities if more than one issue is
raised, or if different interests much be weighed and balanced. In ad-
dition a court must understand certain social and psychological real-
ities that often condition the effectiveness of the legal process in coming
to grips with mental health problems.
It has been the endeavor of this comment to give a progressive court
guidance, when and if confronted with the constitutional right to
treatment issue. Undoubtedly substantial problems will confront a
court in terms of implementation and enforcement even after recogni-
tion of the right occurs. Such problems are beyond the scope of this
comment. This comment has only attempted to show why and how a
court must act initially in the area, what its priorities should be, and
how any action it takes need not be inconsistent with responsible views
of the functions of the judicial process. The ultimate goal of adequate
care and treatment for the institutionalized mentally ill may remain
distant-but recognition and judicial awareness remains a necessary
first step to improvement of conditions. After being so long ignored,
even first steps constitute important improvements for the legal status
of the mentally ill.
CHARLES W. KENRICK
625
